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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 
Amici Curiae, whose biographies are set out in Appendix A, are university professors 
who have conducted research on or have other relevant experience with the problems 
of eyewitness identification.  Amici seek to provide the Court with an accurate summary 
of findings from eyewitness identification research and particularly to highlight research 
concerning the effect of an alleged eyewitness’s familiarity with a suspect on the 
reliability of the witness’ identification of the suspect.  
 
1 
ARGUMENT 
Even When Eyewitnesses Are Familiar With A Suspect, Such As In Guilbert, 
Experts Should Be Allowed To Testify To Ensure That Jurors Can Adequately 
Assess The Reliability of The Eyewitness Evidence1 
Since its decision in State v. Kemp, 199 Conn. 473 (1986), this Court and lower 
courts in Connecticut have consistently barred experts from testifying about the factors 
that undermine the reliability of eyewitness identifications on the ground that such 
information falls within the common knowledge of the average juror. State v. Outing, 
298 Conn. 34, 98-99 (2010) (Palmer, J., dissenting); see, e.g., State v. McClendon, 248 
Conn. 572, 589-91 (1999).  The trial court below followed  this scientifically-unsupported 
practice when it relied on Kemp’s reasoning to exclude expert testimony on a myriad of 
relevant factors (Def.’s Br. 9, 15). 
Contrary to the trial court’s finding and the State’s arguments on appeal, 
substantial empirical evidence shows that many factors affecting the reliability of 
eyewitness identifications are not common knowledge. Without expert evidence, jurors 
will likely be misled by their commonly held—but incorrect—beliefs and assumptions. 
The court below erroneously concluded that concerns about the reliability of 
eyewitness identifications are eliminated when an eyewitness is “familiar” with the 
identified person. Scientifically-designed research studies show that far from 
unequivocally increasing identification accuracy, familiarity affects eyewitness 
identifications in nuanced, complex, and often counterintuitive ways. Consequently, 
familiarity is just one of the many factors that affect eyewitness identification accuracy 
and whose effects fall outside jurors’ common knowledge.  
                                                            
1  Amici and counsel are grateful to Juliana M. Soic, Duke University School of 
Law, Class of 2012, for her invaluable contributions to this brief. 
2 
The recognition and identification of familiar faces has been the focus of much 
scholarly attention in the fields of psychology and neuroscience. See, e.g., Nancy 
Kanwisher & Morris Moscovitch, THE COGNITIVE NEUROPSYCHOLOGY OF FACE 
PROCESSING 3-4 (2000); B. Rossion, et al., Task Modulation of Brain Activity Related to 
Familiar and Unfamiliar Face Processing, 110 CLINICAL NEUROPHYSIOLOGY 449, 449 
(1999). As a general matter, the accuracy of facial recognition and identification 
increases as a function of familiarity: ceteris paribus, people can recognize their own 
faces better than those of celebrities, the faces of celebrities better than those of 
acquaintances, and those of acquaintances better than those of strangers. See, e.g., 
Stephan M. Collishaw & Graham J. Hole, Featural and Configurational Processes in the 
Recognition of Faces of Different Familiarity, 29 PERCEPTION 893, 900-01 (2000); P.N. 
Shapiro & S. Penrod, Meta-analysis of Facial Identification Studies, 100 PSYCHOL. BULL. 
139, 139-56 (1986).  Within this general framework, however, empirical findings have 
painted an unexpectedly intricate and less straightforward picture. 
In individual cases, research shows that identifications of familiar faces—like 
identifications of unfamiliar faces—are counterintuitively influenced by a host of 
variables: interaction time, contextual information, expectation, post-event information, 
and own-race bias. By changing how the brain perceives and processes interactions, 
these variables simultaneously increase the probability that an individual will identify a 
given face as familiar and inflate the individual’s confidence in the identification—
regardless of whether the face is familiar or the identification accurate. Additionally, 
because multiple factors that hinder eyewitness identifications of strangers have 
similarly deleterious effects on non-stranger identifications, it is highly likely that the 
3 
underlying cognitive processes for identifying familiar and unfamiliar faces are 
sufficiently similar that other factors that affect the identification of strangers (e.g., 
weapons effect and stress) similarly affect the identification on non-strangers.  
A. Many Unique Factors Can Interact With Familiarity To Produce 
Counterintuitive Results 
 The most obvious and relevant difference between stranger and non-stranger 
identifications is pre-event exposure time: previous interaction with a person is a 
prerequisite for familiarity, but a negating condition for unfamiliarity. As a matter of 
commonsense, the more time spent interacting with a person, the more thoroughly the 
unique physical characteristics of that person should be encoded, and thus the more 
accurate recognition and identification becomes. Indeed, increased interaction time 
does seem to produce marginally more accurate identifications. See J. Don Read, The 
Availability Heuristic in Person Identification, 9 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 91, 97 
(1995) (determining that test subjects’ slight increase in correct identification due to 
increased familiarity was statistically insignificant). 
However, a larger and more counterintuitive result that stems from increased 
interaction time with a familiar subject is the greater propensity to identify false positives 
(incorrect selections of strangers’ photographs from lineups that contain and do not 
contain the familiar person’s photograph). See id. at 98; see also José H. Kerstholdt et 
al., The Effect of Availability on the Identification of Known and Unknown Persons, 6 
APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 173, 179-80 (1992) (“For both known and unknown target 
persons the number of misidentifications increased with longer exposure times.”); J. 
Don Read et al., Changing Photos of Faces: Effects of Exposure Duration and Photo 
Similarity on Recognition and the Accuracy-Confidence Relationship, 16 J. 
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EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY, & COGNITION 870, 875 (1990) (similar 
finding).  
This counterintuitive relationship was most clearly demonstrated in a study that 
examined the effect of increased interaction time on store clerks’ ability to accurately 
recognize and identify a female target. Read, The Availability Heuristic, supra, at 94-
100. Half of the clerks (“short-interaction” clerks) spoke with the female target for 30-60 
seconds; the other half (“long-interaction” clerks) were interviewed by the female target 
for between four and twelve minutes.2 Id. at 95-96. Two days later, all clerks were asked 
to identify the target’s picture in various photographic lineups; some lineups contained 
the target’s photo, while others did not. Id. 
On the whole, “[t]he largest and most reliable effects of increased duration [of 
interaction] were seen in the clerk’s [sic] greater willingness to identify someone from 
the lineups . . . .” Id. at 97. But that greater willingness in no way correlated with an 
increased ability to choose the correct photograph. Id. at 97-99. For both target-present 
and target-absent lineups, the long-interaction clerks more often picked out a stranger 
and identified her as the interviewer. Id. at 98. The long-interaction clerks’ performance 
                                                            
2  A total of 112 store clerks participated in the study. In the 30- to 60-second 
scenario, the clerks were first approached by a research assistant (RA1) posing as a 
mother who was looking for her daughter, whom RA1 was supposed to meet at the 
store.  RA1 provided an accurate description of the daughter and her clothes, and 
asked whether the daughter had been in the store.  About 15 minutes later, a second 
research assistant (RA2), posing as the daughter, entered the store and asked the 
clerks if her mother had been in the store.  All of the clerks told RA2 that her mother had 
stopped in the store.  RA2 (the target) spent in total about 30-60 seconds in the store.   
In the four- to twelve-minute scenario, the female target interviewed the clerks as 
part of a fake research project on eyewitness testimony and asked the clerks questions 
about the identity of a male customer (another researcher) who had come into the store 
two days earlier. The clerks were unaware that the actual experiment involved 
identifying the female researcher. 
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deteriorated most severely—and most disturbingly for eyewitness identification 
purposes—in target-absent lineups: with increased interaction time, the percentage of 
clerks who incorrectly said the target was present more than doubled.3 Id. at 97. This 
performance decline was “entirely attributable” to the clerks’ increased propensity to 
select a stranger’s photograph. Id. at 99. 
This increased propensity to choose a photograph erroneously is explained by 
the effect of increased exposure on self-perception. Id.; cf. Kerstholt et al., supra, at 180 
(suggesting that reduced accuracy also may be due to a combination of increased 
exposure time and poor viewing conditions).  The clerks who had interacted with the 
target for a longer period of time were more confident they were well-equipped to make 
identifications and thus more frequently chose a photograph from the lineup. Id. 
Unfortunately, they were mistaken. Although long-interaction clerks reported a greater 
aggregate quantity of information about the target, the absolute amount of correct 
information reported was the same for both long- and short-interaction clerks. Id. Simply 
put, increased interaction time causes people to think that they remember more about a 
familiar person’s physical appearance than they actually do; that more often leads them 
to erroneously conclude that strangers who look familiar are, in fact, the familiar person. 
 Whereas increased interaction time increases false-positive identifications by 
altering self-perception, context increases false positives through unconscious, 
associative distortions. In particular, subconscious expectations and the presentation of 
contextual information (such as information about the person’s background, personality, 
                                                            
3  Whereas only 27.8% incorrectly said the target was present after the short 
interaction, more than half (54.3%) answered incorrectly after the longer interaction. 
Read, The Availability Heuristic, supra at 97. 
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or the circumstances in which the person is typically encountered) serve as “priming” 
mechanisms that increase the probability of mistaken identifications. See Kerstholdt et 
al., supra, at 173-78 (witnesses’ expectation of seeing a known person led to a 44% 
increase in false-positive identifications); Read, The Availability Heuristic, supra, at 115 
(presenting subjects with additional contextual information about a familiar target made 
them twice as likely to choose false positives); accord Andrew W. Young et al., The 
Faces That Launched a Thousand Slips: Everyday Difficulties and Errors in 
Recognizing People, 76 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 495, 505 (1985) (witnesses in the experiment 
were more likely to identify strangers as familiar when they were expecting a familiar 
person).  
This effect of context is due largely to the unique cognitive processes that 
underlie how one recognizes familiar faces. Significant neuroscientific data suggest that 
the successful recognition of familiar faces—unlike that of unfamiliar faces—involves 
not only visual familiarity, but also emotional responses and “person knowledge” stored 
in long-term memory (e.g., personal traits, biographic information, and episodic 
memories associated with the individual). See M. Ida Gobbini & James V. Haxby, 
Neural Systems for Recognition of Familiar Faces, 49 NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 32, 32-33 
(2007); see also Kerstholt et al., supra at 173 (“[F]or a successful identification [of a 
familiar face] to occur more specific information is needed such as where the person 
lives, his or her occupation and where he or she is usually encountered.”). 
Consequently, problems with any one of these streams can negatively impact familiar 
face recognition. Moreover, the intermingling of processing streams sometimes allows 
7 
increased input from one stream hijacking the other streams to produce unexpected 
results. 
Such hijacking is an example of the “availability heuristic,” which has been well-
documented in other recall-based tasks. Read, The Availability Heuristic, supra, at 93; 
see C.M. Kelley & D.S. Lindsay, Remembering Mistaken for Knowing: Ease of Retrieval 
As a Basis for Confidence in Answers to General Knowledge Questions, 32 J. MEMORY 
& LANGUAGE 1, 1-24 (1993); A. Tversky & D. Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for 
Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 207-32 (1973). As 
applied to facial recognition, the availability heuristic predicts that “enhanced contextual 
information increase[s] the ease of recall of information . . . and that that this familiarity 
[i]s misattributed to perceptual familiarity.” Read, The Availability Heuristic, supra, at 
103. Expectation similarly “raises the basic activation level of the face recognition unit” 
to enhance the ease of recall and produce the same misattribution effect. Kerstholt et 
al., supra, at 170 (citing V. Bruce & A. Young, Understanding Face Recognition, 77 
BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 305 (1986)). Thus, because information about a familiar individual’s 
identity is already stored in an identifier’s brain, both contextual information and 
expectations, which are triggered by surroundings or circumstances associated with the 
familiar person, “prime” the identifier’s brain and thereby increase the likelihood that the 
identifier will misidentify a stranger as the familiar individual. 
B. Irrespective of Familiarity, Other Factors Also Affect Eyewitness 
Identification  
 
Although there are unique cognitive processes that affect familiar eyewitness 
identifications, there also are other cognitive processes implicated in all facial 
recognition, regardless of familiarity. See, e.g., J. Kirkland Reynolds & Kathy Pezdek, 
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Face Recognition Memory: The Effects of Duration and Encoding Instruction, 6 APPLIED 
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 279, 290 (1992). Consequently, it is almost certain that many of the 
factors known to make eyewitness identification of strangers unreliable will similarly 
affect non-stranger eyewitness identifications. 
 Both mundane and less obvious factors have been shown unexpectedly to affect 
the accuracy of eyewitness identification, irrespective of familiarity.  For commonplace 
factors like poor viewing conditions and facial typicality, what is surprising is the size of 
the deleterious effects. In one study, bad lighting and a hooded sweatshirt on the 
subject reduced correct identifications of known subjects by 28.6%. Kerstholt et al., 
supra, at 179.  
Because of the “typicality effect,” individuals are more likely to recognize a typical 
but unfamiliar face as familiar than they are to misidentify an atypical familiar face.   
See, e.g., John R. Vokey & J. Don Read, Typicality, Familiarity, and the Recognition of 
Male and Female Faces, 42 CAN. J. PSYCHOL. 489, 493 (1988); James C. Bartlett et al., 
Typicality and Familiarity of Faces, 12 MEMORY & COGNITION 219, 219 (1984). This is 
because “increased typicality is associated with increased general familiarity and 
decreased memorability.” Vokey & Read, supra, at 294. Moreover, “familiarity arising 
from some specific prior exposure is not intrinsically separable from the structurally 
induced familiarity that arises from a lifetime of experience with similar exemplars.” Id. at 
300. 
 Less obvious phenomena—namely, the own-race bias (ORB) effect and post-
event information-- may also affect both familiar and unfamiliar face recognition. The 
effect of post-event contextual information discussed above applies to the identification 
9 
of strangers and non-strangers alike. See, e.g., People v. Legrand, 867 N.E.2d 374, 379 
(N.Y. 2007).  
The Own Race Bias effect is resilient and pronounced.  This effect occurs across 
memory tasks (e.g., face recognition, face matching, and lineup identifications), and is 
resistant to time and familiarity manipulations, and replicable in a wide variety of 
experimental settings.  Christian A. Meissner & John C. Brigham, Thirty Years of 
Investigating the Own-Race Bias in Memory for Faces, 7 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 3, 5 
(2001); Kathy Pezdek & Stacia Stolzenberg, How Accurately Do Eyewitnesses 
Determine if a Person is Familiar? 10-13 (Sept. 29, 2010) (unpublished manuscript, on 
file with the authors of this brief).  In a meta-analysis of 91 studies and 39 research 
articles, Own Race Bias was found consistently to decrease correct identifications and 
increase false-positive identifications.  Meissner & Brigham, supra, at 15; see also, 
Pezdek & Stolzenberg, supra, at 13 (a study of the ORB effect found “recognition 
accuracy for casually familiar non-strangers is not reliably higher than that for 
strangers.”)  
Finally, it is now well-established that eyewitness’ confidence is also an 
unreliable predictor of accuracy across the board. E.g., Amina Memon et al., Exposure 
Duration: Effects on Eyewitness Accuracy and Confidence, 94 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 339, 
349 (2003); Pezdek & Stolzenberg, supra, at 13; Read, The Availability Heuristic, supra, 
at 115. 
CONCLUSION 
Empirical evidence and an array of DNA exonerations have confirmed that 
familiarity does not eliminate misidentification problems. Even with familiar faces, 
people are significantly worse at recognizing faces than they expect.  Judges and juries, 
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however, do not take this into consideration and instead think that eyewitness testimony 
“is particularly valuable where . . . lay [eye]witnesses are able to make the challenged 
identifications based on their familiarity with characteristics of the defendant . . . .” 
United States v. Langford, 802 F.2d 1176, 1179 (9th Cir. 1986) (emphasis added); 
accord United States v. Beck, 418 F.3d 1008, 1015 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. 
Jackman, 48 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Jackson, 688 F.2d 1121, 1125 
(7th Cir. 1982).  Such increased willingness to rely on eyewitness testimony of non-
strangers has significantly contributed to many wrongful convictions.4  For that reason, 
this Court should overturn Kemp’s scientifically-unsound presumption that factors 
affecting the accuracy of eyewitness identifications are within the common knowledge of 
the average juror and, in circumstances like those in Guilbert, permit expert testimony to 
assist the jury in properly assessing the reliability of eyewitness evidence. 
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4  DNA exonerations have occurred in numerous cases in which the defendant was 
erroneously identified by an eyewitness who had prior experience with him.  (Mark 
Bravo; Danny Brown; Charles Dobbs; Gerald Davis; Dewey Davis; Charles Elkins; and 
Robert McClendon)  See Innocence Project Case Profiles, INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2010). 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Neil Vidmar is Russell M. Robinson II Professor of Law at Duke Law School and 
Professor of Psychology at Duke University. He holds a Ph.D. in social psychology from 
the University of Illinois (1967) and conducts empirical studies on issues in the legal 
system. He has published research on eye witness reliability and the effects of 
eyewitness evidence on jurors in peer review journals. He is co-author of Judging the 
Jury (1986) and editor/author of World Jury Systems (2000). Vidmar has published 
more than 100 articles in law reviews and social science journals (e.g., Stanford Law 
Review, Law & Human Behavior, Law & Society Review, and Duke Law Journal). He 
reviews research proposals for the National Science Foundation and is a current or past 
member of the following editorial boards: Law & Human Behavior; Law & Society 
Review; Law& Social Inquiry; Journal of Applied Social Psychology; Psychology Crime 
and Law; Legal and Criminological Psychology; Psychology, Public Policy and Law; and 
the Journal of Empirical Legal Studies. 
 
Kenneth Deffenbacher is Emeritus Professor of Psychology at the University of 
Nebraska at Omaha and holds a Ph.D. in experimental psychology from the University 
of Washington (1968). For more than 30 years, he has researched the variables 
affecting the fidelity of eyewitness report. Among his many published studies, which 
have appeared in various peer-reviewed journals, was the first published report noting 
the weak correlation between eyewitness confidence and accuracy, as well as various 
articles explaining the effects of heightened stress and forgetting on eyewitness 
identification. Dr. Deffenbacher co-authored Perception and the Senses (1979) and 
more than 60 journal articles and chapters in edited volumes of scientific papers. He 
also regularly reviews grant proposals for the National Science Foundation, has been a 
member of the editorial board of the Journal of Applied Psychology, and regularly 
reviews for the Law and Human Behavior and Memory & Cognition periodicals. Dr. 
Deffenbacher has been called to testify as an expert witness on eyewitness 
identification issues in both state and federal criminal trials. 
 
Solomon Fulero is both a practicing attorney and a psychologist.  Dr. Fulero received 
his Ph.D. in social psychology and his law degree from the University of Oregon in 
August 1979 and December 1979 respectively, and a respecialization certificate in 
clinical psychology from Wright State University in June 1988.  He is Professor and 
former Chair of Psychology at Sinclair College in Dayton, Ohio, Clinical Professor of 
Psychology and Psychiatry at Wright State University in Dayton, and Adjunct Professor 
of Law at the University of Cincinnati School of Law.  Dr. Fulero maintains private 
practices in both psychology and law, and is a frequent expert witness on matters 
pertaining to legal psychology, in both social/experimental (eyewitness testimony, 
interrogations and confessions, pretrial publicity, etc.) and clinical (competency, sanity, 
sexual predator status, competency to waive Miranda rights, etc.) areas.  His work on 
mental retardation, suggestibility, and confessions was cited by the U.S. Supreme Court 
in Atkins v. Virginia.   He is the author or co-author of numerous scholarly articles in 
both psychology journals and law reviews, as well as the textbook “Forensic 
Psychology, 3rd Edition,” published by Cengage. He appeared on the CBS 48 Hours 
A2 
episode “Eyewitness,” and was a member of the National Institute of Justice Technical 
Working Group on Eyewitness Evidence.  Dr. Fulero is a Fellow of the American 
Psychological Association.  He has served on the Executive Committee of the American 
Psychology-Law Society (APLS), and was President of APLS in 2003-2004. 
 
Harmon M. Hosch earned his Ph.D. in Personality and Social Psychology from the 
New School 
for Social Research in 1976 and is the Helen M.C. and J. Edward Stern Professor of 
Psychology at the University of Texas at El Paso. He previously served as Chairman of 
the Department of Psychology and now is Associate Dean of Liberal Arts. Dr. Hosch 
conducts empirical studies on the social psychological processes underlying jurors’ and 
juries’ decisions in legal cases. He has focused his work on the impact of expert 
testimony on jury decisions and the factors that influence eyewitness accuracy. From 
1996 to 1998, he served as a visiting scientist at the National Science Foundation, 
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